The effect of such inclusive definition vis-à-vis restrictive definition is well known. In Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. Labour Commissioner and Ors. (2007) IIILLJ1 SC, this Court held;
When an interpretation clause uses the word “includes”, it is prima facie extensive. When it uses the word “means and includes”, it will afford an exhaustive explanation to the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to the word or expression.
Almost to the same effect is the decision of this Court in N.D.P. Namboodripad (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and Ors. AIR2007 SC1782, wherein the law was stated in the following terming:
The word “includes” has different meanings in different contexts. Standard dictionaries assign more than one meaning to the word “include”. Webster’s Dictionary defines the word “include” as synonymous with “comprise” or “contain”. Illustrated Oxford Dictionary defines the word “include” as: (i) comprise or reckon in as a part of a whole; (ii) treat or regard as so included. Collins Dictionary of English Language defines the word “includes” as: (i) to have as contents or part of the contents; be made up of or contain; (ii) to add as part of something else; put in as part of a set, regrouped or a category; (iii) to contain as a secondary or minor ingredient or element. It is no doubt true that generally when the word “include” is used in a definition clause, it is used as a word of enlargement, that is to make the definition extensive and not restrictive. But the word “includes” is also used to connote a specific pregnant, that is, as “means and includes” or “comprises” or “consists of.”
In The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. Vs.Respondents: The State of Gujarat and Anr. (1976)4SCC601
Though ‘include’ is generally used in interpretation clauses’ as a word of enlargement, in some cases the context might suggest a different intention. Pottery is an expression of very wide import, embracing all objects made of clay and hardened by heat. If it had been the legislature’s intention to bring within the entry all possible articles of pottery, it was quite unnecessary to add an Explanation. We have found that the Explanation could not possibly have been introduced to extend the meaning of potteries industry or the articles listed therein added ex abundanti cautela. It seems to us therefore that the legislature did not intend every thing that the potteries industry turns out to be covered by the entry. What then could be the purpose of the Explanation? The Explanation says that, for the purpose of entry 22, potteries industry ‘includes* manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word ‘includes’ has been used here in the sense of ‘means’, this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of entry 22. The use of the word ‘includes’ in the restrictive sense is not unknown. The observation of Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899) A.C.105, which is usually referred to on the use of ‘include’ as a word of extension, is followed by these lines: “But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions”. It must therefore be held that the manufacture of Mangalore pattern roofing tiles is outside the purview of entry 22.
In Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank Employees Union: (2007)IILLJ825SC, it was held;
…It is timeworn to state that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word “means” is used, what follows is meant to verbalize thoroughly. When the word “means” is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher, M.R. in Gough v. Gough it is a “difficult-and-tight” definition and no meaning other than that which is place in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also glimpse P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology.: (1981)ILLJ358SC) Page 2301 On the other hand, when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not think to curtail the definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not thorough. That is to tell, the term defined will hold its average meaning but its scope would be widened to convey within it matters, which in its average meaning may or may not consist. Therefore, the use of the word “means” followed by the word “includes” in Section 2(bb) of the ID Act is understandably declarative of the legislative intent to do the definition thorough and would frost merely those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other.
In Commercial Taxation Officer, Udaipur v. Rajasthan Taxchem Ltd.: 2008S.T.R.660, it was held;
We have already extracted the definition of raw material under Section 2(34) which specifically includes fuel required for the purpose of manufacture as raw material. The word includes gives a wider meaning to the words or phrases in the statute. The word includes is usually used in the interpretation clause in order to enlarge the meaning of the words in the statute. When the word include is used in the words or phrases, it must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their nature and impact but also those things which the interpretation clause declares they shall include. There is no dispute in the instant case that the diesel and lubricant is used to generate electricity through DG sets which is admittedly used for the purpose of manufacturing yarn. Thus, it is seen that as diesel is specifically and intentionally included in the definition of raw material by the legislature, the question that whether it is directly or indirectly used in the process of manufacture is irrelevant as argued by Mr Sushil Kumar Jain.
In Associated Indem Mechanical (P) Ltd. v. W.B. Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. and Ors.: AIR2007 SC788, this Court held;
As the language shows, the definition of the word “premises” as given in Section 2(c) of the Act is a very comprehensive one and it not only means any building or hut or part of a building or hut and a seat in a room, let separately, but also includes god owns, gardens and outhouses appurtenant thereto and also any furniture supplied or any fittings or fixtures affixed for the use of the tenant in such building, hut or seat in a room, as the case may be.
In Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of Andhra Pradesh: 1988(38)ELT714(SC), under the provisions of Section 8 of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act, the “tobacco” is defined in the following term:
Tobacco means any form of tobacco, whether cured or uncured and whether fabricated or not, and includes the leaf, stalks and stems of the tobacco plant, but does not incorporate any part of a tobacco plant while however attached to the earth.
It was thrown that the same consists of two freestanding parts which stipulate what the expression means and too what it includes is plainly meant to be thoroughgoing.
Treatise of Justice G.P. Singh titled “Principles of Statutory Interpretation “states:
…But the word `include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions used. It may be equivalent to `mean and include’ and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which for the purposes of the Act must invariably be attached to those words or expressions”. Thus, the word include may in certain contexts be a word of limitation. relying on the decisions of this Court in The Municipal Council, Raipur v. State of Madhya Pradesh : 1970CriLJ1656, South Gujarat Roofing Tile Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat : 1SCR878, Hindustan Aluminum Corporation v. State of Uttar Pradesh : 1983(13)ELT1656(SC), and Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. : 2SCR1.
Reference to Carter v. Bradbeer (1975) 3 All ER 158, can be done in the aforesaid treatise. The House of Lords was covering therein with a case where one word “bar” had more than one meaning and in that context, it was opined:
It may good be that the contention advanced on behalf of the appellant sought to infer from the interpretation section a measure of support which that section does not yield. By Section 201(1) of the 1964 Act it is provided that in the Act, unless the context differently requires, `”bar” includes any place alone or primarily used for the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor’. It is significant to note the word `includes’. As used in Section 201, I regard the word `includes’ as denoting that the word `bar’ may name to and may grasp not only what would commonly and in mutual parlance be uttered of as a bar but also some place (such as a bar-room) which is solely or primarily used for the sale and consumption of intoxicating liquor.
It was noticed;
I experience not the tenuous doubt that anyone asked if the sales took place at a bar would unhesitatingly answer Yes. Parliament must be assumed to use the English language in its average instinctive sense unless the context shows a perverse intention. If no obstinate intention is shown, then one is driven to the conclusion that Parliament thought in Section 76(5) the word `bar’ to comprise counters such as were present in this case, and to proscribe the use of such counters during the replaced countenanced hours. Som